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THE UBERIZATION OF ARBITRATION CLAUSES
By
Jill I. Gross*
I.

INTRODUCTION

As the public policy debate over the propriety of mandatory arbitration 1 rages on,2
many companies continue to insert pre-dispute arbitration agreements (PDAAs) into their
adhesive consumer and employment contracts,3 mandating arbitration of any dispute
arising out of or relating to the contract. These clauses often strip the weaker party of its
right to pursue claims as class or collective actions (class action waivers).4 Companies
justify their use of these PDAAs on the ground that arbitration is a cheaper and more
efficient yet fair method of dispute resolution,5 while consumers and employees argue that
*

Professor of Law, Elisabeth Haub School of Law, Pace University. I am grateful for the research assistance
of Emily Rawdon, Pace J.D. Candidate, May 2018.
I define “mandatory” arbitration in this context as arbitration resulting from a predispute arbitration clause
in an adhesive agreement between parties of unequal bargaining power.
1

2

See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, Disarming Employees: How American Employers are Using Mandatory Arbitration
to Deprive Workers of Legal Protection, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 1309, 1310 (2015) (critiquing employers’ use of
mandatory arbitration to decrease employees’ access to justice); Alexander J.S. Colvin, Mandatory Arbitration
and Inequality of Justice in Employment, 35 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 71, 90 (2014) (“[R]ather than enhancing
equality, mandatory arbitration exacerbates inequality in access to justice in the workplace.”); Thomas J.
Stipanowich, The Arbitration Fairness Index: Using a Public Rating System to Skirt the Legal Logjam and
Promote Fairer and More Effective Arbitration of Employment and Consumer Disputes, 60 U. KAN. L. REV. 985,
988-91 (2012) (identifying fairness concerns surrounding the growth of mandatory arbitration clauses).
3

See Arbitration Study: Report to Congress pursuant to Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act § 1028(a), CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU (Mar. 2015),
http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201503_cfpb_arbitration-study-report-to-congress-2015.pdf (reporting
data on companies’ use of PDAAs and class action waivers in consumer financial agreements).
4

See Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration Clauses Prevent Consumers from Presenting
Procedurally Difficult Claims, 42 SW. L. REV. 87, 87-88 (2012); Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility
LLC v. Concepcion Impedes Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 704 (2012); David S. Schwartz, ClaimSuppressing Arbitration: The New Rules, 87 IND. L.J. 239, 240 (2012); see also Ross v. Am. Express Co., 35
F. Supp. 3d 407, 415-30 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (detailing concerted actions, including twenty-eight group meetings
of issuer banks across the credit card industry, to include PDAAs in customer agreements to suppress
consumers’ ability to bring class action suits against the industry); see also Nancy A. Welsh & Stephen J.
Ware, Ross et al. v. American Express et al.: The Story Behind the Spread of Class Action-Barring
Arbitration Clauses in Credit Card Agreements, 21 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 18 (2014) (detailing findings of the
Ross court).
See 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 257 (2009) (stating that “[p]arties generally favor arbitration
precisely because of the economics of dispute resolution”). But see Thomas J. Stipanowich & J. Ryan Lamare,
Living with ADR: Evolving Perceptions and Use of Mediation, Arbitration and Conflict Management in
Fortune 1000 Corporations, 19 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 7-8 (2014) (identifying at least 14 different reasons
why parties choose to arbitrate).
5
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they are forced into an unfair dispute resolution forum tilted in favor of repeat player
corporations with superior bargaining power.6
Uber Technologies, Inc. (Uber), founded in March 2009 and headquartered in San
Francisco, California,7 finds itself a “gig economy”8 company smack in the middle of this
debate. To make transportation more efficient and reliable around the world,9 Uber
develops, markets and operates the Uber app, which allows individuals with
smartphones to submit a transportation request. The app then sends the request to one of
Uber’s subsidiaries, also known as “third party Transportation Companies,” which, in turn,
forwards the request to the Uber driver nearest to the requester, alerting the driver to the
location of the customer.10 The driver can then accept the request and pick up the rider.
The Uber app automatically calculates the fare, charges the rider’s credit card pre-linked
to the account, and transfers payment to the driver.11
Since its official launch in San Francisco in July 2010, Uber has experienced rapid
and explosive worldwide growth. By May 2011, it offered its service in New York City,
started expanding internationally in December 2011, and by early 2017, operated in 545
cities in 66 countries around the world.12 All during this operating expansion, the company
6

See Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the Deck of Justice,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2015, at A1; Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN.
L. REV. 1631, 1650-51 (2005) (“Whereas a given company will tend to arbitrate many consumer disputes, a
given consumer or employee will typically arbitrate, at most, one. Thus, the companies have far greater
experience with and exposure to the arbitration process than do the consumers or employees. There is some
limited empirical evidence that the repeat player does somewhat better in arbitration than the nonrepeat
player.”); Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration: The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y
J. 189, 190-91 (1997).
7

See
Company
Overview
of
Uber
Technologies,
Inc.,
BLOOMBERG,
http://www.bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapid=144524848 (last visited Feb. 9,
2017). Uber was launched in March 2009 as UberCab, but shortened its name to Uber in October 2010 a few
days after local taxi regulators issued cease and desist notices to Uber for, inter alia, operating a taxi service
without a license.
See Ryan Graves, Uber has been served, NEWSROOM (Oct. 25, 2010),
https://newsroom.uber.com/uber-has-been-served/ (last visited Feb. 9, 2016).
“The gig economy is the collection of markets that match providers to consumers on a gig (or job) basis in
support of on-demand commerce.” Sarah A. Dononvan, David H. Bradley, and Jon O. Shimabukuro, What
Does the Gig Economy Mean for Workers?, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44365, at Summary (Feb. 5, 2016),
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44365.pdf. The gig economy is sometimes referred to as the “sharing
economy.”
8

9

See Maya Kosoff, The vision Uber’s CEO has for his $50 billion company suggests the startup is only
beginning to scratch the surface, BUSINESS INSIDER (June 4, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/traviskalanicks-vision-for-uber-2015-6. In addition, the term “Uberize” has come to mean “to modify a market or
economic model by the introduction of a cheap and efficient alternative.” See WIKTIONARY (June 17, 2016),
https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/uberize (last visited Feb. 26, 2017).
10

See Razak v. Uber Techs., Inc., Civ. No. 16-573, 2016 WL 3960556, at *1 (E.D. Pa. July 21, 2016).

11

Id.

12

See Uber (company), WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uber_(company).
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raised hundreds of millions of dollars from private investors and in January 2017 was
valued at $68 billion.13
As a transportation industry “disrupter”14 rapidly rolling out aggressive expansion
plans, Uber also has been sued in court more than any other “gig economy” company.15
Many of those lawsuits were filed as putative class actions. Uber drivers filed the first class
action lawsuit against the company in 2012;16 by early 2017, both Uber drivers and
passengers had filed dozens of class actions against Uber. In these lawsuits,
riders/passengers have alleged primarily three types of claims against Uber: (1)
misrepresentations and omissions regarding safety measures, background checks, and
other efforts it takes to provide safety for its customers;17 (2) antitrust violations in the form
of a price-fixing conspiracy through its pricing algorithms;18 and (3) overcharging or
charging fictitious fees.19 Drivers have alleged primarily three types of claims against Uber:
(1) classification of drivers as independent contractors rather than employees in violation
of applicable labor laws;20 (2) wrongfully depriving drivers of gratuities or other types of
13

See Madeline Johnson, Will Uber be the hottest IPO of 2017?, ZACKS (Jan. 9, 2017),
https://www.zacks.com/stock/news/244845/will-uber-be-the-hottest-ipo-of-2017 (last visited Feb. 26, 2017).
14

A disrupter challenges and attempts to radically change the way an industry traditionally does business.
See Charlotte Rogers, What does it mean to be a disruptor?, MARKETING WEEK (Sept. 28, 2016),
https://www.marketingweek.com/2016/09/28/what-does-it-mean-to-be-a-disruptor/ (last visited Feb. 26,
2017).
15

See Kristen V. Brown, Uber is facing a staggering number of lawsuits, FUSION (Jan. 25, 2016),
http://fusion.net/story/257423/everyone-is-suing-uber/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2017) (reporting more than fifty
lawsuits filed in federal court against Uber in 2015 alone). In fact, Uber has been sued more than any other
United States start-up company valued at $10 billion or more. See Kristen V. Brown, Here’s what’s going
on with all of those Uber lawsuits, FUSION (June 16, 2016), http://fusion.net/story/315350/uber-class-actionlawsuit-settlement/ (last visited Feb. 11, 2017).
See O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. C-13-3826 EMC, 2014 WL 1760314, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 2,
2014) (citing to Ehret v. Uber Technologies, Inc., 14–cv–0113–EMC (N.D. Cal.), a class action originally
filed by Uber drivers in 2012 in Illinois state court which was dismissed and re-filed in federal district court,
and which similarly alleged that Uber misrepresented to riders the amount of gratuity it paid its drivers).
16

17

See Philliben v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 14-CV-05615-JST, 2016 WL 4537912 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2016).

18

See Meyer v. Kalanick, 200 F. Supp. 3d 408 (S.D.N.Y. 2016).

19

See Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. CV 14-14750-DPW, 2016 WL 3751652 (D. Mass. July 11, 2016)
(alleging Uber overcharged a putative class of riders for travel in Boston area by imposing fictitious fees
hidden in charges for legitimate local tolls); Tadepalli v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 15-CV-04348-MEJ, 2016
WL 1622881 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2016) (fictitious fees); Ehret v. Uber Techs., Inc., 148 F. Supp. 3d 884, 889
(N.D. Cal. 2015) (certifying class in suit alleging false misrepresentations regarding gratuities).
20

See, e.g., Singh v. Uber Techs. Inc., No. CV 16-3044 (FLW), 2017 WL 396545 (D.N.J. Jan. 30, 2017);
Richemond v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 16-CV-23267, 2017 WL 416123 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 27, 2017); Gunn v.
Uber Techs., Inc., No. 116CV01668SEBMJD, 2017 WL 386816 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 27, 2017); Scroggins v. Uber
Techs., Inc., No. 116CV01419SEBMJD, 2017 WL 373299 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 26, 2017); Zawada v. Uber Techs.,
Inc., No. 16-CV-11334, 2016 WL 7439198 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 27, 2016) (appeal filed); Razak v. Uber Techs.,
Inc., No. CV 16-573, 2016 WL 7241795 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 14, 2016); Marc v. Uber Techs., No.
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compensation;21 and (3) improperly using background checks in its hiring and firing
decisions.22 Finally, both drivers and riders brought class actions alleging Uber sent
unsolicited text messages in violation of the Federal Consumer Protection Act.23
Not long after the first few of those class actions were filed, and following a series
of rulings by the United States Supreme Court strictly enforcing adhesive arbitration
clauses with class action waivers,24 in May 2013 Uber inserted a PDAA with a class and
collective action waiver in agreements with its drivers and riders. Uber’s legal maneuver
generated dozens of challenges to its PDAA in oppositions to Uber’s motions to compel
arbitration it filed in the class action lawsuits across the country, and thus dozens of court
decisions contributing to modern Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) jurisprudence.25 Indeed,
as of spring 2017, more than 140 federal and state court opinions in which Uber is a
defendant have been reported on Westlaw. About half of those rule on an issue involving
the application of the FAA stemming from Uber’s motions to compel.26
This article explores those decisions, which offer a window into one company’s use
of a forced pre-dispute arbitration clause with a class action waiver. The article first briefly
lays out current federal arbitration law, highlighting three critical and recent Supreme Court
cases relevant to Uber’s PDAA. Part III then describes Uber’s use of a PDAA against this
landscape and how that use differed for Uber drivers as compared to Uber passengers. Part
IV explores a few of the more prominent class actions against Uber, and the arbitrationrelated opinions they generated. Part V extracts some lessons from how courts reacted to
the multitude and variety of challenges to Uber’s PDAA. The article concludes by noting
that UBER’s rapid and worldwide development of a cheaper and more efficient yet
controversial mode of transportation parallels the growth in companies’ “Uberization” of
216CV579FTM99MRM, 2016 WL 7210886, (M.D. Fla. Dec. 13, 2016); O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No.
13-CV-032826-EMC, 2016 WL 4398271 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2016); Rimel v. Uber Techs., Inc., No.
615CV2191ORL41KRS, 2016 WL 6246812 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 4, 2016).
21

See, e.g., Congdon v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 16-CV-02499-YGR, 2016 WL 7157854 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 8,
2016); Micheletti v. Uber Techs, Inc., No. CV 15-1001, __ F. Supp.3d __, 2016 WL 5793799 (W.D. Tex.
Oct. 3, 2016); Lee v. Uber Techs., No. 15 C 11756, 2016 WL 5417215 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 2016).
22

See Mohamed v. Uber Techs., Inc., 848 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2016).

23

See In re: Uber Techs., Inc., Tel. Consumer Prot. Act (Tcpa) Litig., No. MDL 2733, 2016 WL 5846034
(U.S. Jud. Pan. Mult. Lit. Oct. 3, 2016) (denying plaintiffs’ motion to centralize litigation—eight actions
pending in five districts—in the Northern District of Illinois all alleging that Uber violated the Telephone
Consumer Protection Act by sending unsolicited text messages to plaintiffs' wireless telephones without their
prior express consent or after they revoked consent, using an automatic telephone dialing system).
24

See discussion infra Part II, notes 43-50 and accompanying text.

25

See infra Parts III and IV.

26

See discussion infra Parts III and IV (plaintiffs in these cases argued that, inter alia, a clause delegating to
the arbitrator the power to decide questions of arbitrability was unconscionable and thus challenges to
arbitrability should be heard by courts; the arbitration clause itself was unconscionable; or that the parties did
not enter into a valid agreement to arbitrate due to lack of mutual assent).

46

arbitration clauses, designed to facilitate a cheaper and more efficient yet controversial
mode of resolving disputes.
II.

THE SUPREME COURT AND ARBITRATION

Since the 1980s, the Supreme Court has interpreted section two of the FAA27—
which declares the validity, irrevocability, and enforceability of arbitration agreements—
to reflect a “liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements.”28 The Court has held
that (1) lower courts must apply a presumption of arbitrability when deciding challenges
to arbitrability;29 (2) the FAA applies in state and federal court to arbitration clauses in all
agreements “involving commerce”;30 (3) the FAA preempts conflicting state law;31 and (4)
federal statutory claims are arbitrable as a matter of public policy unless Congress
explicitly states they are not.32
In the early part of this decade, the Court continued this trend of strictly enforcing
PDAAs. Three decisions in particular, all authored by Justice Scalia, removed legal
obstacles to companies like Uber seeking to compel arbitration of all disputes arising
between parties—including arbitrability disputes33—and seeking to enforce class action

27

Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).

28

Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983).

29

Id. at 24-25.

By its terms, the FAA governs agreements to arbitrate “transactions involving commerce.” 9 U.S.C. § 2
(2012). The Supreme Court has interpreted this phrase broadly to include any transaction that in fact involves
interstate commerce, even if the parties did not anticipate an interstate impact. See Allied-Bruce Terminix
Cos., v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 273-74, 281 (1995).
30

Under the FAA preemption doctrine, the FAA preempts any state law that “actually conflicts with federal
law—that is, to the extent that it ‘stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full
purposes and objectives of Congress.’” Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ.,
489 U.S. 468, 477 (1989) (quoting Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941)); see also Doctor’s Assocs.,
Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 683 (1996) (preempting Montana statute requiring specific type of notice in
contract containing arbitration clause); Allied-Bruce Terminix, 513 U.S. at 272-73 (preempting Alabama statute
invalidating PDAAs in consumer contracts); Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 488-89 (1987) (preempting California
statute requiring wage collection actions to be resolved in court).
31

32

See CompuCredit Corp. v. Greenwood, 132 S. Ct. 665, 669 (2012) (federal statutory rights are arbitrable
absent a “contrary Congressional command”).
See Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010). “Arbitrability” refers to whether a particular
dispute can, as a legal matter, be resolved through arbitration.
33

47

waivers.34 These decisions, discussed below, have had the cumulative effect of eliminating
virtually all defenses to arbitrability and converting PDAAs into “super contracts.”35
First, in 2010, the Court enforced a “delegation provision”36 in a contract delegating
arbitrability decisions to arbitrators.37 In that case, in response to an employer’s motion to
compel arbitration of an employment discrimination action, the employee challenged the
arbitrability of the discrimination dispute (the merits dispute) on the grounds that the
arbitration agreement was procedurally and substantively unconscionable.38 At that time,
it was well-settled that courts, not arbitrators, decide challenges to the substantive
arbitrability of a dispute “’unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide
otherwise.’”39
Jackson conceded that the delegation provision was clear and unmistakable but
claimed that his assent was not valid because it was the product of unconscionability.40
However, the Court treated the delegation provision as an agreement to arbitrate
arbitrability disputes separable41 from the agreement to arbitrate merits disputes. Because

34

See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion,
131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011).
See Jill I. Gross, Justice Scalia's Hat Trick and the Supreme Court’s Flawed Understanding of TwentyFirst Century Arbitration, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 111, 124 (2015); Richard Frankel, The Arbitration Clause as
Super Contract, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 531, 533 (2014); Thomas J. Stipanowich, Arbitration: The “New
Litigation,” 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 1, 9 (2010) (“In the twentieth century, pre-dispute (or ‘executory’)
arbitration agreements evolved from disfavored status to judicially denominated ‘super-clauses.’”).
35

The Court defined a “delegation provision” as “an agreement to arbitrate threshold issues concerning the
arbitration agreement.” Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. at 68.
36

Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. at 68 (the delegation provision stated that “[t]he Arbitrator, and not any federal,
state, or local court or agency, shall have exclusive authority to resolve any dispute relating to the interpretation,
applicability, enforceability or formation of this Agreement including, but not limited to any claim that all or
any part of this Agreement is void or voidable.”).
37

38

Id. at 65-66. Jackson did not argue that the delegation provision, standing alone, was unconscionable. Id.
at 72-73.
Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S 79, 83 (2002) (citing AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc’ns
Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 649 (1986)). Most federal courts considering the issue hold that the incorporation by
reference of an arbitration forum’s rules that empower arbitrators to decide substantive arbitrability
constitutes such “clear and unmistakable evidence.” See, e.g., Eckert/Wordell Architects, Inc. v FJM
Properties of Willmar LLC, 756 F.3d 1098, 1100 (8th Cir. 2014) (AAA rules); Brennan v. Opus Bank, 796
F.3d 1125, 1131 (9th Cir. 2015) (same). But see Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC v. Scout Petroleum, LLC, 809
F.3d 746 (3d Cir. 2016) (incorporation of AAA rules is not “clear and unmistakable” evidence parties
intended to delegate issue of class arbitrability to arbitrators).
39

40

Jackson, 561 U.S. at 69, n.1.

41

Under the separability doctrine, valid agreements to arbitrate are separable from their underlying
agreements and an arbitrator decides the enforceability of the underlying agreement absent “clear and
unmistakable evidence” that the parties wanted a court to decide questions of arbitrability. See First Options
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the employee challenged as unconscionable the underlying agreement to arbitrate merits
disputes (as opposed to the delegation provision), the Court found that the delegation
provision was valid and enforceable.42 As a result, arbitrators would decide whether the
arbitration clause itself was unconscionable.
The following year, the Court enforced a class action waiver in a PDAA, thus
compelling individual arbitration of plaintiffs’ claims of fraud arising out of their purchase
of a cell phone.43 The Court ruled that the FAA preempts California’s Discover Bank rule,
which “classif[ied] most collective-arbitration waivers in consumer contracts as
unconscionable,”44 because the rule treated adhesive arbitration clauses with a class action
waiver differently than non-arbitration contracts.
Finally, in 2013, the Court ruled that arbitration clauses were enforceable even if
one party could not, as a practical matter, vindicate its rights in arbitration.45 In Italian
Colors, a group of merchants accepting American Express charge cards sued American
Express in federal court for federal antitrust violations. The parties’ agreement contained a
PDAA and a class action waiver.46 Opposing defendant’s motion to compel arbitration, the
merchants challenged the enforceability of the class action waiver, arguing that, if they
could not proceed as a class, they had no financially feasible means of pursuing their
antitrust claims.47 The Second Circuit refused to enforce the class action waiver, finding
that the cost of individual arbitration precluded plaintiff merchants from vindicating their
statutory rights.48
The Court reversed, finding that “the fact that it is not worth the expense involved
in proving a statutory remedy does not constitute the elimination of the right to pursue that

of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995); Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388
U.S. 395, 402-03 (1967).
42

Rent-A-Center, 561 U.S. at 71-72.

43

AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011). Plaintiffs Vincent and Liza Concepcion
accepted an AT&T Mobility offer for a free cell phone. When they discovered they were charged $30.22 in
sales tax, the Concepcions sued AT&T Mobility in federal district court on behalf of a class of similarly situated
consumers, alleging that AT&T Mobility’s “practice of charging sales tax on a cell phone advertised as ‘free’
was fraudulent.” Id. at 1746.
44

Id. In Discover Bank v. Superior Court of L.A., 113 P.3d 1100, 1103 (Cal. 2005), overruled by AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 342 (2011), the California Supreme Court applied California’s
unconscionability law to void class action waivers in arbitration agreements.
45

Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013).

46

Id. at 2308.

An expert estimated that if the allegations were proven, an individual plaintiff’s maximum recovery would
be $12,850 (see Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2308), an amount that would have been dwarfed by extensive
discovery and expert witness costs.
47

See In re Am. Express Merch. Litig., 667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir. 2012), rev’d sub nom. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S.
Ct. 2304 (2013).
48

49

remedy.”49 Though the Court recognized in dicta the effective vindication exception,50 it
concluded that the exception did not apply to that case. Because the class action waiver in
the merchants’ charge card service agreements with American Express did not eliminate
plaintiffs’ right to pursue (only their ability to pursue) their claims under the antitrust laws,
the waiver was enforceable.
By limiting the vindicating rights doctrine to the narrow situation where an
arbitration clause strips a party of the right to prove its case, or where forum fees are “so
high as to make access to the forum impracticable,”51 the Court sharply narrowed that
defense to arbitrability—even though other costs might make it unfeasible for the party to
pursue the case. Combined with Rent-A-Center and Concepcion, Italian Colors sends a
strong message to companies that PDAAs with class action waivers in adhesive contracts
as well as delegation clauses were enforceable against virtually all challenges.52
III.

CLASS ACTIONS BY RIDERS

Against this landscape of Supreme Court FAA jurisprudence, Uber, not
surprisingly, first utilized a PDAA in May 2013, when it inserted one in a revised
agreement with passengers.53 Uber’s PDAA included an agreement broad in scope to
resolve “any dispute, claim or controversy arising out of or relating to this Agreement or
the breach, termination, enforcement, interpretation or validity thereof or the use of the
Service or Application.”54 The PDAA further provided that the arbitration would be
49

Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2311.

Id. at 2310-11. Under the then-existing “effective vindication” doctrine, an arbitration agreement is
unenforceable if an unfair aspect of the arbitration process precludes the party from vindicating its federal
statutory rights. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985)
(“[S]o long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral
forum, the [federal] statute [providing that cause of action] will continue to serve both its remedial and
deterrent function”); see also Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 92 (2000) (implying, in
dicta, that if a party showed that pursuing its statutory claims through arbitration would be prohibitively
expensive, and thus it could not vindicate its statutory rights, a court could validly refuse to enforce a PDAA).
50

51

Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2311.

52

See Gross, supra note 35, at 132.

53

Perhaps it did so in response to one of the first class actions it faced: a lawsuit filed by riders in state court
in Illinois alleging that Uber misrepresented to riders the amount of gratuity it paid its drivers. See Ehret v.
Uber Techs., Inc., C.A. No. 12CH36714 (Cir. Ct. Cook Co.); see also O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No.
C-13-3826 EMC, 2014 WL 1760314, at *1 (N.D. Cal. May 2, 2014) (reporting that the Illinois court
dismissed the Ehret lawsuit based on a choice of forum clause and that the class of riders refiled the case in
U.S. district court for the Northern District of California styled as Ehret v. Uber, Technologies, Inc., 14–cv–
0113–EMC).
54

The clause provided:
Dispute Resolution. You and Company agree that any dispute, claim or controversy
arising out of or relating to this Agreement or the breach, termination, enforcement,
interpretation or validity thereof or the use of the Service or Application (collectively,

50

administered by the American Arbitration Association (AAA) in accordance with its
Commercial Arbitration Rules and its Supplementary Procedures for Consumer Disputes.
The arbitration clause also included a waiver of the right to bring class, collective and
representative actions, and carved out from its scope any individual claim that could be
brought in a small claims court. Uber also agreed to pay “arbitration-related fees” for any
rider’s claim under $75,000.55 No ability to opt out of the PDAA was offered;56 if a
passenger wanted to download the Uber app after that date or continue to use a pre-existing
account, the passenger had to agree to the PDAA.
Riders seeking to pursue their claims as class actions have resisted Uber’s motions
to compel individual arbitration on one primary ground: they did not agree to arbitrate any
claim with Uber because they did not manifest assent to the agreement containing the
clause–Uber’s Terms and Conditions (“TAC”).57 Thus far, most courts considering this
argument have rejected it, concluding that Uber’s TAC is a valid “sign-in wrap” agreement.
For example, in Cullinane v. Uber Technologies, plaintiffs filed a putative class action in
federal district court in the District of Massachusetts, alleging that Uber “overcharged them
for travel to and from Boston Logan Airport and East Boston by imposing fictitious fees
hidden in charges for legitimate local tolls” in violation of Massachusetts law.58
Uber moved to compel arbitration, invoking the rider PDAA.59 Plaintiffs opposed
on the ground that they did not enter into a valid agreement to arbitrate disputes with Uber,

“Disputes”) will be settled by binding arbitration, except that each party retains the right
to bring an individual action in small claims court and the right to seek injunctive or other
equitable relief in a court of competent jurisdiction to prevent the actual or threatened
infringement, misappropriation or violation of a party's copyrights, trademarks, trade
secrets, patents or other intellectual property rights. You acknowledge and agree that you
and Company are each waiving the right to a trial by jury or to participate as a
plaintiff or class User in any purported class action or representative proceeding.
Further, unless both you and Company otherwise agree in writing, the arbitrator may not
consolidate more than one person's claims, and may not otherwise preside over any form
of any class or representative proceeding. If this specific paragraph is held unenforceable,
then the entirety of this “Dispute Resolution” section will be deemed void. Except as
provided in the preceding sentence, this “Dispute Resolution” section will survive any
termination of this Agreement.
Meyer v. Kalanick, 200 F. Supp. 3d 408, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (emphasis in original).
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It is well-settled that parties seeking to enforce a PDAA must first establish that a valid agreement to
arbitrate exists. See Rent-A-Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772 (2010) (explaining that, on a
motion to compel arbitration, the court “’shall’” order arbitration “’upon being satisfied that the making of
the agreement for arbitration…is not in issue’”) (quoting from FAA § 4).
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Cullinane, 2016 WL 3751652, at *1.
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as they could open an account without ever reading the arbitration clause contained in the
TAC.60
Interestingly, Judge Douglas Woodlock’s opinion ruling on the motion started by
announcing his general disagreement with FAA jurisprudence:
The practice of avoiding consumer class action litigation through the use of
arbitration agreements is the subject of current scholarly disapproval and
skeptical investigative journalism. … Nevertheless, the legal foundation
provided in Supreme Court jurisprudence regarding the Federal Arbitration
Act for construction of arbitration agreements that bar consumer class
actions is firmly embedded. Even Justices who question the practice find
themselves bound to adhere to the blueprint opinions the Court has
provided.
The plaintiff in this case extends an invitation to disassemble the judicial
construct permitting a bar to class action litigation for consumer arbitration
agreements. The invitation suggests teasing out distinctions that truly make
no difference. This is not an institutionally authorized nor intellectually
honest way to change practice and legal policy regarding the permissible
scope of arbitration. Change, if it is to come, must be effected by a
refinement through legislation and/or regulation that imposes restrictions on
arbitration agreements, or by a reversal of direction on the part of the
Supreme Court. It is not within the writ of the lower courts to replot the
contours of arbitration law when the metes and bounds have been set
clearly, unambiguously and recently by the Supreme Court.61
After its philosophical pronouncement, the Cullinane court described in detail the
process for a passenger to sign up for an Uber account through an Apple iPhone app.62 On
the app, passengers navigated through a three-step process, each with its own screen.63 The
first two screens required the rider to enter personal information, create a password, and
create a profile including an uploaded photograph to enable the driver to identify the rider
at pickup.64 The third screen required the user to enter credit card information so as to allow
Uber to automatically charge the rider for completed Uber rides. As described by one court,
Cullinane, 2016 WL 3751652, at *7. Under applicable Massachusetts law, a so-called “clickwrap”
agreement is enforceable only if plaintiffs had “reasonable notice” of the arbitration clause. Id.
60
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Id. at *1 (internal citations omitted).
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According to the Complaint, the named plaintiffs created their Uber accounts via an iPhone. Complaint at
¶¶ 11-12, Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. CV 14-14750-DPW (D. Mass. July 11, 2016), 2016 WL
3751652.
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Cullinane, 2016 WL 3751652, at *2-3.
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Id.

52

“[i]mmediately below the credit card information input box, and above the keyboard,
appear the [key phrase], ‘By creating an Uber account, you agree to the Terms of Service
& Privacy Policy.’”65 Those words “appear in bold white lettering on a black background,
and are surrounded by a gray box, indicating a button. The other words are in gray lettering.
If a user clicks the button that says ‘Terms of Service & Privacy Policy,’ the Terms of
Service then in effect are displayed on the phone.”66 Those Terms of Service included an
arbitration clause (on page 9), as described above, under the heading “Dispute Resolution.”
Once the rider entered payment information, the rider clicked the button “Done” in
the top-right-hand corner of the screen to complete account creation.67 A rider did not have
to click on the hyperlink or read the language of the TAC in order to create or continue
using the account.
The court then turned to the legal issue of whether, under those circumstances, an
agreement to arbitrate had been formed. Ultimately, applying Massachusetts law, the court
ruled that the parties had mutually assented to the arbitration clause because the “process
through which the plaintiffs established their accounts put them on reasonable notice that
their affirmative act of signing up also bound them to Uber’s Agreement.”68 Judge
Woodlock noted that the key phrase of the agreement on the final registration screen “is
prominent enough to put a reasonable user on notice of the terms of the [account
a]greement.”69 Because the final screen mentioned that terms and conditions existed, the
passenger agreed to be bound by the hyperlinked terms by proceeding further even without
clicking on the hyperlink.70 Other federal district courts have similarly concluded that
passengers opening an Uber account have entered into a valid agreement with Uber by
clicking on the on-line “Done” button.71
In contrast, in Meyer v. Kalanick, Judge Jed Rakoff in the Southern District of New
York addressed the same issue and reached the opposite conclusion.72 Spencer Meyer, on
behalf of a class of plaintiffs, sued Uber and its CEO, Travis Kalanick, alleging that
65

Cullinane, 2016 WL 3751652, at *2.
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Id. (internal and factual citations omitted).
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Id.
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Cullinane, 2016 WL 3751652, at *7.
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Id.

The Cullinane court then dismissed plaintiffs’ remaining challenges to the arbitration clause itself. The
court reasoned that, because the TAC incorporated by reference the AAA Commercial Arbitraiton Rules, and
those rules empower the arbitrator to decide questions of arbitrability, the arbitrator must decide plaintiffs’
remaining contentions. Id. at *8-9.
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E.g., Cubria v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. A-16-CA-544-SS, 2017 WL 1034731, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 16,
2017) (“The process through which Plaintiff established her account with Uber put her on reasonable notice
that the act of signing up for Uber's services bound her to the 2013 [Terms and Conditions]”); Cordas v. Uber
Techs., Inc., No. 16-CV-04065-RS, 2017 WL 658847, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2017).
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Kalanick had “orchestrated and participated in an antitrust conspiracy arising from the
algorithm that co-defendant Uber [] uses to set ride prices.”73 In response to Uber’s motion
to compel arbitration of the lawsuit, plaintiffs argued that they did not enter into a valid
arbitration agreement for lack of mutual assent.
Perhaps as a direct rebuttal to Judge Woodlock’s opening paragraphs in Cullinane,
Judge Rakoff similarly began his opinion in a broad, philosophical manner:
Since the late eighteenth century, the Constitution of the United States and
the constitutions or laws of the several states have guaranteed U.S. citizens
the right to a jury trial. This most precious and fundamental right can be
waived only if the waiver is knowing and voluntary, with the courts
“indulg[ing] every reasonable presumption against waiver.”74
Following this bold reminder of the fundamental right to a jury trial, Judge Rakoff
first decided that California law applied, and outlined the law on the enforceability of
clickwrap agreements.
The district court then evaluated the October 2014 version of Uber’s passenger
TAC, and concluded that the parties did not enter into a valid agreement. As described by
Judge Rakoff, the process for signing up for an Uber account was virtually identical to the
process described by Judge Woodlock in Cullinane,75 absent one critical distinction: the
named plaintiffs in Meyer created their accounts on a Samsung Galaxy smartphone which
used an Android operating system, unlike the named plaintiffs in Cullinane who created
their accounts on an iPhone which uses the iOS operating system.76
Apparently, as a result of the use of different operating systems, the critical
language on the final screen differed in appearance from the language and design seen by
the Cullinane plaintiffs.77 As described by Judge Rakoff, the words, “[b]y creating an Uber
account, you agree to the Terms of Service & Privacy Policy,” was “in considerably smaller
font” than the language above it, was not in all-caps or otherwise emphasized or
highlighted, and, “indeed, are barely legible.”78
Judge Rakoff expressly distinguished Culliname on the grounds that the key phrase
of agreement in that case was more prominent than the one Judge Rakoff examined, as it
was “clearly delineated, and the words appeared in bold white lettering on a black
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Meyer, 200 F. Supp. 3d at 411.
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Id. at 410.

75

One noncritical difference was that the process described by Judge Rakoff involved two steps, not three.
However, the final screen in both Meyer and Cullinane is the screen at issue in both cases.
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Meyer, 200 F. Supp. 3d at 414; see also Complaint at ¶¶ 11-12, Cullinane v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. CV 1414750-DPW (D. Mass. July 11, 2016), 2016 WL 3751652.
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Meyer, 200 F. Supp. 3d at 418.
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background.”79 In contrast, the key phrase Judge Rakoff examined was in a smaller font
and “more obscure.”80 Accordingly, the district court concluded that “plaintiff Meyer did
not have ‘[r]easonably conspicuous notice’ of Uber’s User Agreement, including its
arbitration clause, or evince ‘unambiguous manifestation of asset to those terms.’”81
After the Meyer decision, in November of 2016, Uber revised its agreement with
riders to add a delegation clause delegating substantive arbitrability decisions to an
arbitrator, and to move the bold warning and entire PDAA up to the top of the “Terms and
Conditions.”82 This move is designed to foreclose future arbitratability challenges from
being heard in court. It also appears that Uber updated its passenger app so that the critical
language (“[b]y continuing, I confirm that I have read and agree to the Terms and
Conditions and Privacy Policy”) appears exactly the same on an iPhone and an Android
phone.83 Thus, it seems that Uber has learned from its losses before Judge Rakoff and
strengthened the enforceability of the PDAA so that courts will dismiss future rider class
actions and send individual plaintiffs to arbitration.
IV.

CLASS ACTIONS BY DRIVERS

Uber’s use of a PDAA in its agreements with drivers differs in several respects from
its use of one with riders. In July 2013, and just after the Supreme Court’s Italian Colors
ruling, Uber inserted a PDAA in its agreements with drivers that was similar but not
identical to the rider PDAA Uber first utilized a few months earlier.84 The driver PDAA
required all disputes “to be resolved only by an arbitrator through final and binding
arbitration and not by way of court or jury trial.”85 Unlike the rider PDAA, the driver PDAA
contained a delegation provision and a waiver under California’s Private Attorney General
Act (PAGA).86 Like the rider PDAA, the driver PDAA contained class and collective
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Id. at 420. Uber has appealed the Meyer decision. At the time of publication of this article, that appeal was
pending. This author joined an amicus brief filed by a group of Law Professors in that appeal arguing for
affirmance.
Uber’s clause effective Nov. 21, 2016 is available at https://www.uber.com/legal/terms/us/. The clause it
replaced (Jan. 2, 2016 version) is available at https://www.uber.com/legal/other/US-terms-pre-Nov-2016/.
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Screenshots from both phones on file with author.

By the end of 2012, like for riders, Uber faced a driver class action in Massachusetts state court over Uber’s
gratuity policy. See Lavitman v. Uber Techs., Inc., C.A. No. 12–4490, 32 Mass. L. Rptr. 476 (Mass. Super.
Ct. (Suffolk) Jan. 26, 2015).
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PAGA authorizes an “aggrieved employee” to “bring a civil action personally and on behalf of other current
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action waivers. Interestingly, the driver PDAA carved out from the general delegation
provision challenges to those waivers. The PDAA also provided drivers with thirty days to
opt out of the arbitration provision. However, opting out required drivers to deliver by hand
or via “a nationally recognized overnight delivery service” to Uber’s general counsel, a
letter clearly indicating an intent to opt out.87 If drivers did not opt out and continued to use
the Uber app, they were deemed to have accepted the arbitration agreement.88
New drivers downloading the app had to click “I agree to the terms and conditions”
at least twice before the download could complete. The words “terms and conditions” were
hyperlinked to a separate page containing the full, multi-page terms and conditions of the
agreement between Uber and drivers, which contained a warning that it included an
arbitration provision in bold language at the beginning.89 Similar to riders, a driver had to
click on a hyperlink to see the actual language of the “[t]erms and [c]onditions” and could
click on the “I agree” button and become an Uber driver without ever actually viewing the
language.
When drivers filed federal class actions against Uber all over the country raising
various claims,90 Uber quickly moved to compel arbitration in these actions. Virtually all
district courts that have ruled on Uber’s motion have granted that motion. These courts
have ruled consistently that drivers assented to the clickwrap agreement containing the
arbitration clause, the parties clearly and unmistakably delegated gateway arbitrability
issues to the arbitrator, the delegation clause was not unconscionable, the class action
waiver did not render the arbitration clause unconscionable, and/or the class action waiver
did not prevent plaintiffs from effectively vindicating their statutory rights. 91 These
Angeles, LLC, 327 P.3d 129, 146 (Cal. 2014) (holding that PAGA waivers violate California public policy
and FAA does not preempt this California rule).
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Lee v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 15 C 11756, 2016 WL 5417215, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 21, 2016).

88

Id.

89

The warning read:
PLEASE REVIEW THE ARBITRATION PROVISION SET FORTH BELOW
CAREFULLY, AS IT WILL REQUIRE YOU TO RESOLVE DISPUTES WITH THE
COMPANY ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS THROUGH FINAL AND BINDING
ARBITRATION UNLESS YOU CHOOSE TO OPT OUT OF THE ARBITRATION
PROVISION.... IF YOU DO NOT WISH TO BE SUBJECT TO ARBITRATION, YOU
MAY OPT OUT OF THE ARBITRATION PROVISION BY FOLLOWING THE
INSTRUCTIONS PROVIDED IN THE ARBITRATION PROVISION BELOW.
Zawada v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 16-CV-11334, 2016 WL 7439198, at *6-7 (E.D. Mich. Dec. 27, 2016).
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See, e.g., Mohamed v. Uber Techs., Inc., 848 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2016); Peng v. Uber Techs., Inc., No.
16CV545PKCRER, 2017 WL 722007 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2017); Guan v. Uber Techs., Inc., No.
16CV598PKCCLP, 2017 WL 744564, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2017); Gunn v. Uber Techs., Inc., No.
116CV01668SEBMJD, 2017 WL 386816, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Jan. 27, 2017); Richemond v. Uber Techs., Inc.,
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decisions effectively ended the driver class actions and sent drivers across the country to
arbitration to pursue their claims individually.
Of these arbitration rulings, only one—Mohamed—issued from a Court of Appeals.
In November 2014, a putative class of California drivers sued Uber in the Northern District
of California, alleging violations of the Fair Credit Reporting Act stemming from Uber’s
use of background checks in its hiring and firing decisions.92 After Uber filed motions to
compel arbitration, Judge Edward Chen rejected plaintiffs’ challenge to the enforceability
of the PDAA for lack of mutual assent, but ruled that the delegation clause was not clear
and unmistakable evidence of the parties’ intent to delegate arbitrability decisions to the
arbitration, and the delegation clause was unconscionable.93 Judge Chen also ruled that the
PDAA itself was unconscionable.94
In late 2016, the Ninth Circuit reversed Judge Chen and ruled that the delegation
clause within Uber’s agreement with drivers was valid and enforceable.95 The Court of
Appeals found that the delegation clause was unambiguous and that it was a clear and
unmistakable manifestation of the parties’ intent to delegate arbitrability questions to the
arbitrator.96 The Court also ruled that the delegation clause was not unconscionable. Thus,
the Court of Appeals ordered the parties “to arbitrate their dispute over arbitrability.”97 One
factor that supported the court’s rejection of plaintiffs’ claim that the delegation clause was
unconscionable was Uber’s commitment to the court that it had agreed to pay all arbitration
costs of individual claimants.98
One driver case (improper classification) filed in the Northern District of California
and also assigned to Judge Chen proceeded along a very different track than most other
driver class actions.99 Early on in the life of the O’Connor case, instead of focusing on the
validity of the PDAA, Judge Edward Chen invoked Rule 23(d) of the Federal Rules of

16-CV-02499-YGR, 2016 WL 7157854 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 8, 2016); Micheletti v. Uber Techs, Inc., No. CV
15-1001, __ F. Supp. 3d __, 2016 WL 5793799 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 3, 2016). At least seven other courts have
ruled similarly.
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See Mohamed v. Uber Techs., Inc., 109 F. Supp. 3d 1185 (N.D. Cal. 2015), aff'd in part, rev'd in part and
remanded, 836 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2016), aff'd in part, rev'd in part and remanded, 848 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir.
2016).
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Id. at 1210-11. The Court did uphold the district court’s ruling that the PAGA waiver was unenforceable,
but disagreed with the district court that it was severable from the PDAA. Id. at 1212-14.
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Civil Procedure100 to control communications with class members.101 He concluded that
Uber’s attempt to send drivers a revised licensing agreement with a PDAA and an opt-out
clause violated Rule 23(d) because it did not inform drivers of already existing class
actions, including O’Connor, and the impact any opt-out could have on drivers’ rights to
participate in those actions.102
As a result, Judge Chen ordered Uber to revise its arbitration clause with drivers.103
Specifically, the court required Uber to give clearer notice of the arbitration provision,
notice of the effect of agreeing to arbitrate on their participation in the O’Connor lawsuit,
and reasonable means of opting out of the arbitration provision within thirty days of the
notice. The court also expressly ordered Uber to apply the revised PDAA to past, current
and future drivers (retrospectively).104
After a series of efforts by Uber to secure approval from the district court for its
revised driver PDAA, Judge Chen approved the amended clause in May 2014 with a few
more important revisions.105 Specifically, Judge Chen ordered: “Uber shall provide in the
notices and in its Revised Licensing Agreement an email address to which opt out notices
may be sent and contact information for Plaintiffs’ counsel. The paragraph in the Revised
Licensing Agreement describing the opt-out procedure should be in bold.”106 The
following month, Uber distributed the revised PDAA to its drivers nationwide (even to
drivers who were not part of the O’Connor class action) pursuant to the court’s order.107
Additional motion practice directed at the PDAA ensued. On December 9, 2015,
Judge Chen held that the PAGA waiver was unenforceable and nonseverable from the
arbitration provision; thus, the PDAA was unenforceable.108 The very next day, Uber
distributed yet another revised PDAA with new opt out language.109 Two weeks later, on
100
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See O’Connor, 2016 WL 6407583, at *7 (“the promulgation of the Licensing Agreement and its arbitration
provision, runs a substantial risk of interfering with the rights of Uber drivers under Rule 23”).
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In September 2015, the O’Connor court certified a subclass of drivers, but excluded any driver who
accepted the Uber contract after June 2014 and did not opt out.
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December 23, 2015, Judge Chen enjoined the distribution of that revised PDAA.110 In May
2016, Judge Chen finally vacated that injunction on the grounds that the parties had
tentatively settled the lawsuits.111
In August 2016, Judge Chen rejected the parties’ proposed settlement of the class
action, and settlement efforts are ongoing.112 However, today, Uber’s nationwide PDAA
still incorporates Judge Chen’s virtually unprecedented rewriting.
V.

LESSONS

What lessons can be drawn from Uber’s use of its rider and driver PDAAs and the
voluminous litigation it generated? Of course, there is the obvious: arbitration clauses
generate a lot of litigation about arbitration.113 Beyond that, below I share numerous
observations from my review of Uber’s nationwide attempt to enforce its PDAAs.
First, good legal advice matters. Assuming Uber inserted arbitration clauses into its
rider agreements back in 2013 on the advice of lawyers, those lawyers could have given
better advice. It is well-established law that contracting parties must be on reasonable
notice of the terms of the contract for a valid contract to be formed. Uber could have
prevented legal losses, such as those seen in Meyer, if its lawyers had better advised Uber
how to set up its account creation screens so as to provide users with reasonable notice of
the terms and conditions governing their contractual relationship. If Uber had designed the
sign-up screen with the key phrase featured more prominently, in either a larger font or
highlighted in some manner, the existence of the Terms and Conditions would have been
more obvious to users and its PDAA would have been more immune to legal challenge. In
addition, the Uber lawyers could have advised Uber to put the rider PDAA towards the
very top of the Terms and Conditions as opposed to “burying” it on later pages. Finally, no
good explanation exists as to why the driver PDAA included a delegation clause but the
rider PDAA did not. While these revisions might not have stopped users from opposing a
motion to compel arbitration, they might have led to a court granting Uber’s motion more
easily and quickly.
On the other hand, Uber’s inclusion of a delegation clause in its driver PDAA
protected its preference for arbitration as a dispute resolution method. By inserting a
delegation provision within a PDAA, companies can ensure that threshold questions of

(E.D. Pa. July 21, 2016) (denying motion to compel arbitration of Philadelphia-based UberBLACK drivers’
claims because plaintiffs had opted out of Uber’s arbitration agreement).
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arbitrability will be heard by an arbitration panel, not a court.114 Unless a reluctant party
directly challenges the enforceability of the delegation provision itself, arbitrability
questions will be routed directly to court, effectively cutting off the reluctant party from
even a threshold review by a court of the validity of the underlying contracts, including the
arbitration agreement.
Similarly, Uber’s use of an opt-out provision when it first distributed its PDAA to
drivers almost single-handedly ensured that a court could not find the PDAA
unconscionable, again preserving arbitration as Uber’s preferred dispute resolution
mechanism. Since unconscionability requires both procedural and substantive
unfairness,115 offering users the opportunity to opt out of the arbitration requirement,
assuming it is a meaningful opportunity and the terms are not hidden, removes any hint of
procedural unfairness.116 It is not a “take it or leave it” adhesive contract; it is a “take it or
opt out” contract. Uber’s lawyers wisely advised it to provide an opt-out.
Second, despite concerns that the Supreme Court has eliminated the ability of the
weaker party to a bargain to void forced arbitration clauses through its twenty-first century
FAA jurisprudence,117 parties reluctant to arbitrate still might be able to successfully
challenge their enforceability. Both Uber drivers and riders have been able to avoid
arbitration of their disputes with Uber in certain factual circumstances on grounds such as
lack of mutual assent and unconscionability. Thus, the savings clause is doing what
Congress designed it to do nearly a hundred years ago: preserving state law grounds for
the revocation of any contract as valid grounds to challenge arbitration contracts.118 This
ensures that any party reluctant to arbitrate can have a court hear a good-faith argument
that it never entered into an agreement of any kind with the party seeking arbitration.
Third, judges’ framing matters. Judge Rakoff framed his opinion in Meyer around
the Seventh Amendment to support the outcome and in sharp distinction to Judge
Woodlock’s framing of his decision in Cullinane around the Supreme Court’s FAA
decisions. This difference in framing can be attributed, at least in part, to Judge Rakoff’s
well-documented history of judicial activism.119 While it remains to be seen if the Second
Circuit will overturn Judge Rakoff’s opinion in Meyer, for now at least, Uber passengers
are not bound by the arbitration clause for the same reason that legions of consumers have
not been bound by print clauses: they could not have agreed to the clause if they did not
have, at a minimum, reasonable notice of the existence of those terms.
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Fourth, Uber successfully used a class action waiver to avoid dozens of costly rider
and driver class actions nationwide. Since Concepcion, courts routinely reject
unconscionability challenges to class action waivers. Including a class action waiver kept
many consumer and employee claims that have no meaningful value absent numerosity
from ever being brought. Thus, because some claims will never be brought as economically
unfeasible, the class action waiver validly immunized Uber from liability on millions of
dollars of otherwise viable claims.120
Fifth, in invoking Rule 23(d), Judge Chen in O’Connor found an underutilized tool
in his judicial toolbox to regulate the content of Uber’s arbitration clause; indeed, to rewrite
it. Generally, neither courts nor regulators have the power to order a company to use
particular words or phrases in its arbitration contracts.121 However, the O’Connor decisions
provide significant precedent supporting a federal district court’s use of FRCP 23(d)
powers to mandate that companies inserting or revising a PDAA in agreements with
putative class members include certain phrases and language to ensure they have been
notified of the impact of an arbitration clause on their legal rights and remedies. 122 This
unusual use of Rule 23(d)—though not unprecedented123— remains unexplored in the
arbitration literature to my knowledge. Though beyond the scope of this article, further
analysis of Rule 23(d)’s impact on the content of arbitration clauses is needed.
Sixth, several federal court Uber decisions illustrate the dialogue that judges often
have with each other regarding their interpretation and use of precedent. Numerous federal
judges explicitly referenced the results of Uber cases in other federal districts when ruling
on the Uber case before them.124 Since so many district court judges have had occasion to
120
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interpret the same Uber PDAA, if one finds unenforceable what another judge found
enforceable, that judge might take particular care in justifying the different outcome
without criticizing it. This might explain Judge Rakoff’s careful distinction in Meyer of
Judge Woodlock’s opinion in Cullinane, since they both evaluated whether plaintiffs had
formed a valid contract with Uber through the exact same account creation process. Also,
when Judge Woodlock stated “[i]t is not within the writ of the lower courts to replot the
contours of arbitration law when the metes and bounds have been set clearly,
unambiguously and recently by the Supreme Court,”125 he spoke directly to other federal
judges who agree that the lower courts are hamstrung by the Supreme Court’s broad
interpretation of the FAA.126
Finally, Uber’s rapid and worldwide development of a cheaper and more efficient
yet controversial mode of transportation parallels the growth in companies’ use of “forced”
arbitration clauses to facilitate a cheaper and more efficient yet controversial mode of
resolving disputes. Uberization is emblematic of society’s move towards more efficient
and less expensive methods of solving problems. Uber solves the transportation problem
by efficiently and cheaply matching riders and drivers. Taxis, often given a monopoly in
some cities through regulation of taxi licenses, sometimes charge exorbitant prices and rely
on outmoded technology (telephone calls or email requests) to locate passengers.
Similarly, Uber solved its dispute resolution problem by opting out of the inefficient
and expensive litigation system in this country and selecting a more efficient and cheaper
dispute resolution mechanism that best suited its needs. Values of process pluralism127 and
contracting autonomy outweighed those of the right to a jury trial and governmental
limitation on parties’ freedom of contract. Through its own dispute resolution choices,
Uber symbolizes the drive to cheaper and more efficient methods of conducting all types
of business.
The plethora of federal court decisions generated by challenges to Uber’s PDAA
provided Uber with a road map to drafting a bulletproof PDAA. Each iteration of Uber’s
PDAA – revised in response to Judge Chen’s Rule 23(d) orders or revised as Uber learned
what courts required to send the dispute to arbitration – reflected Uber’s trial and error
approach to PDAAs. Yet, with each trial, Uber’s PDAA came closer to achieving Uber’s
goal of avoiding litigation and ensuring arbitration of disputes with individual riders and
drivers. The resulting clause is a legally effective algorithm to solve the problem of
economic inefficiencies and high costs stemming from class action litigation.
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